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I. INTRODUCTION
Effective August 1, 1983 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure' was amended in an apparent effort to provide a more
expansive standard for the imposition of attorneys' fees.2 Prior ex-
* Kevin P. Roddy (The Cranbrook School, 1973; B.A., University of North
Carolina, 1977; J.D., University of North Carolina, 1980) is a member of the Vir-
ginia bar and is associated with the firm of Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Un-
derberg, Manley, Myerson, and Casey in Beverly Hills, California.
** William Woodward Webb (The Lawrenceville School, 1964; B.A., Stan-
ford University, 1968; J.D., University of North Carolina, 1971) is a member of
the North Carolina and District of Columbia bars and a member of Broughton,
Wilkins, Webb & Gammon, P.A., in Raleigh, North Carolina.
Mr. Webb and Mr. Roddy are the authors of Some Practical Implications of
Civil RICO Cases, 7 CAMPBELL L. REV. 299 (1985).
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
2. See Blair v. Shenandoah Women's Center, Inc., 757 F.2d 1435, 1437-38 &
n.5 (4th Cir. 1985). The Fourth Circuit stated in Blair that more teeth were put in
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perience' had shown that the former version of Rule 11 was not
effective in deterring abuses and that there had been confusion in
the federal courts regarding the circumstances which should com-
pel a court to take disciplinary action, the standard of conduct to
which attorneys are expected to adhere, and the range of appropri-
ate sanctions.4 Accordingly, the Advisory Committee Notes to the
1983 amendments expressly recognize that the amendments were
intended "to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions,
.. .by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and reen-
forcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions." 5
Experience of practice under the new provisions of Rule 11
demonstrates that, rather than curbing abuses in federal practice,
the promise of sanctions has perhaps caused an upswing in motion
proceedings and may be spawning what one federal judge has
termed "satellite litigation," i.e. "ancillary proceedings that may
themselves assume the dimensions of litigation with a life of its
own." Further, while the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 may have
Rule 11 by the 1983 amendments in order to further discourage "dilatory or abu-
sive tactics" and help "streamline the litigation process" by lessening the amount
of frivolous matters brought before the federal courts. Id. at 1437. Accord Coburn
Optical Indus. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 659 (M.D.N.C. 1985); Federal Pro-
cedure Committee, Sanctions: Rule 11 and Other Powers 3-4 (Litigation Section,
American Bar Association) (1986) [hereinafter Sanctions].
Effective January 1, 1987 the North Carolina counterpart to Federal Rule 11,
N.C. R. Civ. P. 11, was amended to parallel the federal rule. See ch. 1027, § 55,
1985 N.C. SESs. LAWS.
3. Before the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, attorneys' fees could be imposed
against counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) or by the inherent power of
the court. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-67 (1980); Robin-
son v. Ritchie, 646 F.2d 147, 148-49 (4th Cir. 1981). See infra text accompanying
notes 8-28. Additionally, certain federal statutes permit a prevailing party to shift
attorneys' fees and other costs to a losing party. See infra note 8.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. 198 (1983), re-
printed in 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11.0114] at 11-4
(1985).
5. Id. See Tedeschi v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 579 F. Supp.
657, 659-60 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd per curiam, 757 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1985);
See also Index Fund, Inc. v. Hagopian, 107 F.R.D. 95, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (purpose
of amended Rule 11 is two-fold: to deter abuses in the signing of pleadings by
penalizing the offender and to compensate the injured party); Taylor v. Pruden-
tial-Bache Securities, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 226, 229 (N.D.N.Y.) (same), aff'd, 751
F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1984).
6. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look,
104 F.R.D. 181, 183 (1985). Judge Schwarzer notes with irony that "an offending
party seeking to obstruct and delay litigation may welcome the resulting prolifer-
[Vol. 9:11
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made federal judges more willing to penalize lawyers for their abu-
sive litigation practices, there is little uniformity in the manner in
which the rule's requirements are being applied.7
The purpose of this article is to explore the substantive provi-
sions of amended Rule 11 and its historic antecedents, the proce-
dure by which sanctions may be sought and/or imposed, the sanc-
tions which the court may impose and the persons upon whom the
sanctions can be imposed.
ation of proceedings as serving his purposes." Id. at 183-84.
Sanctions have been imposed against counsel for making an inappropriate
and untimely Rule 11 motion. See Fisher Bros. v. Cambridge-Lee Indus., 585 F.
Supp. 69, 72 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Regarding this decision, it has been stated that the
"emphasis on the availability of sanctions will create a pathology of seeking them
.... They may clog the courts with needless sanction motions-the problem of
satellite proceedings." Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay, Prompted the New
Rules of Civil Procedure, NAT'L L.J.. Nov. 28, 1983 at 28. See also Coburn Optical
Indus. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 661 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (sanctions imposed
against defense counsel who responded to plaintiff's Rule 11 motion with their
own motion for fees and costs); Parness, Groundless Pleadings and Certifying
Attorneys in the Federal Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 325, 327 n.5. The costs to
society of frivolous litigation and "satellite litigation" are difficult to measure. It
should be noted, however, that one 1982 study concluded that a single hour spent
by a federal judge on a case costs the taxpayer six hundred dollars. J. KAKALIK &
A. ROBYN, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPENDITURES FOR PROCESS-
ING TORT CASES 49 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1982). Three years later, an-
other commentary estimated the cost to be even higher. Levin and Colliers, Con-
taining the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 227 (1985). Accord Advo
Sys., Inc. v. Waeters, 110 F.R.D. 426, 433 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
7. S. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 45 (Federal Judicial
Center 1985). Mr. Kassin's report was based upon a survey of 292 federal district
court judges. In his report Mr. Kassin concluded that although the 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 11 had apparently increased judicial readiness to enforce the new
certification requirements, their success to date has been limited by interjudge
disagreement about the breadth of the changes, inaccurate judicial perception of
other judges' attitudes and a continued neglect of alternative, non-monetary sanc-
tions. Id. at xi. See also Parness, Three Suggestions For Trial Judges Overseeing
Certification Standards, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 3, 1986, at 28. Critical commentary con-
cerning the amended rule includes Comment, Recent Changes in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Prescriptions to Ease the Pain?, 15 TEx. TECH. L. REv.
887, 900-01 (1984) (sanctioning provisions that were intended to streamline litiga-
tion may create additional work and occupy valuable judicial resources); Sofaer,
Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Federal Rules: On
the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 680, 700-01 (1983) (new
rules went too far in imposing additional burden on majority for abuses of
minority).
1986]
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II. IMPOSITION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES PRIOR TO THE 1983
AMENDMENTS TO RULE 11
Under the traditional "American Rule," each side in litigation
bears its own attorneys' fees and expenses.8 Several exceptions to
this rule, however, have been developed by the federal courts. For
example, where, as a result of a party's efforts a fund is created or
preserved for the benefit of a class, that party's attorney's fee may
be paid on an equitable basis from the fund." Second, fees may be
awarded by the court for "willful disobedience" of a court order,10
or when the losing party has acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wan-
tonly, or for oppressive reasons."11 These exceptions reflect the in-
herent power of the federal courts to allow attorneys' fees in cer-
tain limited cases.12
Statutory enactments have increased the power of the federal
courts to impose sanctions against attorneys appearing before
them. In 1813, Congress enacted a statute providing that any per-
8. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759 (1980). The "American
Rule" differs from practice in England where, since at least 1278, courts have
been authorized to award counsel fees to successful plaintiffs in litigation. Statute
of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, ch. 1. A summary of English practice was offered by
the Supreme Court in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714, 717 (1967). The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions reaffirmed
its adherence to the American Rule. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S.
at 759; Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. at 718.
While the traditional "American Rule" requires each party to bear its own
litigation costs, various statutory provisions permit a prevailing party to shift at-
torneys' fees and other costs to an unsuccessful party. See, e.g., Civil Rights At-
torney's Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (court may allow pre-
vailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) (prevailing plaintiff in antitrust
suit may recover attorney's fee). See also Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New
York, 762 F.2d 243, 252 (2d Cir. 1985) (enumerating statutory exceptions to
American Rule), on remand, 637 F. Supp. 558, 563-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (same).
9. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970); Central Rail-
road & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 125 (1885).
10. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. at 718.
11. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,
129 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). See, e.g., Callow v. Amerace Corp.,
681 F.2d 1242, 1243 (9th Cir. 1982) (fees assessed against plaintiff tax protester
who asserted that Federal Reserve notes were not valid money). See generally
Tedeschi v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 757 F.2d 465, 466 (2d Cir. 1985)
(per curiam) (discussing "bad faith" exception to American Rule).
12. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975);
Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 568 (3d Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 9:11
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son who "multiplied the proceedings in any cause. . . so as to in-
crease costs unreasonably and vexatiously" could be held liable for
"any excess of costs so incurred."' 3 Codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1927,'"
the statute was interpreted by the Supreme Court in its 1980
Roadway Express decision 5 as being restricted to clerk's and mar-
shal's fees, court reporter charges, printing and witness fees, copy-
ing costs, interpreting costs and the fees of court-appointed ex-
perts.' 6 Congress promptly amended section 1927 to include
attorneys' fees.' 7 Imposition of sanctions under the statute, how-
ever, remains limited to attorneys 8 whose conduct is both "unrea-
sonable and vexatious."' 9
13. Act of July 22, 1813, 3 Stat. 21 (1813). The Act is believed to be the
response to the practices of certain United States Attorneys who, being compen-
sated on a piecework basis, "apparently had filed unnecessary lawsuits to inflate
their compensation." Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. at 759 n.6. See also
H.R. 25, 27th Cong., 3d Sess., 21-22 (1842), 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1813).
14. Prior to 1980 the statute provided:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any
case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally such excess costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976). See gener-
ally Annotation, Construction and Application of 28 U.S.C.S. § 1927 Authoriz-
ing Imposition of Liability for Costs on Counsel Who Multiplies the Proceedings
Unreasonably and Vexatiously, 12 A.L.R. FED. 910 (1972 & Supp. 1985).
15. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
16. Id. at 757-58; 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1976).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980) now provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court
of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the pro-
ceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by
the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys'
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
Id.
18. Section 1927 does not authorize the imposition of damages and costs
upon parties. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986);
Maneikis v. Jordan, 678 F.2d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
19. Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 182 (footnote omitted). Before imposing sanc-
tions under § 1927 the federal courts will require a showing that the transgressing
attorney acted in "bad faith." Estate of Blas v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 858, 860 (11th
Cir. 1986); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d at 831; Eavenson, Auchmuty
& Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 544 n.17 (3d Cir. 1985); Nelson v. Pied-
mont Aviation, Inc., 750 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 105 S. Ct. 2358 (1985); Badillo v. Central Steel and Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160,
1164-65 (7th Cir. 1983); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980).
See, e.g., Wold v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp. 166, 167 (D. Colo. 1983) (sanc-
tions imposed under § 1927 where attorney filed motion to disqualify opposing
19861
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The third source of sanctioning power in the federal courts
was Rule 11, originally adopted in 1938.20 Prior to its 1983 amend-
ment, Rule 11 stated that the signature of an attorney "constitutes
a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay."'" The rule was
intended to provide a minimal ethical standard which attorneys
were bound to observe when filing pleadings with the court. In the
law firm in order to harass opposing counsel, cause unnecessary delay and need.
lessly increase cost of litigation). See generally Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 191 &
n.34.
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Advisory Committee Note of 1937, reprinted in 2A
J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11.01[21 at 11-3 (1985). In its
original version Rule 11 stated:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed
by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompa-
nied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The sig-
nature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose
of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may
proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a wilfull viola-
tion of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is
inserted.
The original version of the rule consolidated former Equity Rules 21 (proscribing
the inclusion of scandalous material and impertinence in pleadings) and 24 (re-
quiring the signature of counsel on pleadings). See also Equity Rule 36 (officers
before whom pleadings verified). See generally Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 183;
2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11.01[2] at 11-3 (1985); 5
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1331 at 495 (1969).
The Federal Equity Rules of 1912 may be found at Rules of Practice for the
Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 627 (1912). See also RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH NoTEs
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL PRACTICE 24-25 (W. Dawson ed.
1938). A historical discussion of Rule 11 and its purposes are presented in Risin-
ger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9-14 (1976). See also
Carter, The History and Purposes of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 4, 5 (1985).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
[Vol. 9:11
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words of one court, however, the rule was not promulgated as a
"means of compelling lawyers to compile all of their evidence prior
to signing and filing a complaint"22 and reference to pre-amend-
ment cases indicates that its minimal standards were easily met.2 3
Moreover, Rule 11 provided only two sanctions for counsel's failure
to sign a pleading or for signing it "with intent to defeat the pur-
pose" of the rule or if "scandalous or indecent matter" was in-
serted in the pleading. First, the pleading could be "stricken" as
being "sham and false" and the action would proceed "as though
the pleading had not been served."24 Second, a "willful" violation
of former Rule 11 could subject an attorney to "appropriate disci-
plinary action. '2 5
As the Advisory Committee Note to the 1983 amendments
states, the first sanction provided under former Rule 11 (i.e., strik-
ing pleadings and motions as sham and false) had "rarely been uti-
lized."26 Similarly, perhaps because former Rule 11 did not specify
22. United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (D.N.J. 1983).
23. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 431, 432 (D. Mass. 1983) (plain-
tiff's counsel's statement that he had checked the complaint line by line with his
retained expert and was advised that each allegation was justified satisfied Rule
11 test); In re Ramada Inns Securities Litigation, 550 F. Supp. 1127, 1134-35 (D.
Del. 1982) (Rule 11 satisfied where plaintiff's counsel in class action securities
fraud suit relied solely upon information published in the Wall Street Journal to
support claims). See generally 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 20, at §
1333.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
25. Id.; see generally 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 1334 at 501.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 199 (1983), re-
printed in 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.01[41 at 11-6. Professors
Wright and Miller state:
A motion to dismiss as sham under Rule 11 should not be granted if
there is any possibility that the party can prove his case. Appropriately,
the courts have been reluctant to characterize a pleading as sham unless
it contradicts matters of public record. As was noted by the Supreme
Court in the early case of Bates v. Clark, "[a motion to strike a plea as
sham and frivolous] is an unscientific and unprofessional mode of raising
and deciding a pure issue of law. . . . A motion to strike out a plea is
properly made when it has been filed irregularly, is not sworn to, if that
is required, or wants signature of counsel, or any defect of that character;
but if a real and important issue of law is to be made, that issue should
be raised by demurrer." Rule 11 should not be used to raise issues of
legal sufficiency that more properly can be disposed of by a motion for a
more definite statement or by a motion for summary judgment. The sig-
nature rule, which is designed to encourage honesty in the bar when
bringing and defending actions, ought to be employed only in those rare
1986]
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what types of disciplinary action might be taken by the court in
response to an attorney's violation of the rule, sanctions were infre-
quently imposed.27 Accordingly, the Advisory Committee con-
cluded that former Rule 11 was ineffective in deterring abuses and,
further, that there had been "considerable confusion" regarding (1)
circumstances which should trigger the imposition of sanctions; (2)
the standard of conduct expected of attorneys; and (3) the range of
available and appropriate sanctions.2"
cases in which an attorney deliberately presses an unfounded claim or
defense.
5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 1334 at 502-03 (quoting Bates v.
Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1877)). According to one commentator, during the pe-
riod between 1950 and 1976 only nineteen adversarial Rule 11 motions were
made. Risinger, supra note 20, at 35. In ten of these cases the district courts
found violations of the rule and struck pleadings or dismissed the suit. Id. at 36.
Far more often, however, the courts denied motions to strike pleadings, relying on
the presumption that counsel had filed the pleading in good faith. See, e.g., Lau
Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956); Murchinson v. Kirby, 27
F.R.D. 14, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Long, 10 F.R.D. 443, 445 (D. Neb.
1950).
An excellent survey of pre-1983 practice under Rule 11 may be found in
Note, Civil Procedure-The Demise of a Subjective Bad Faith Standard Under
Amended Rule 11, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 107, 115-21 (1986). See also Risinger, supra note
20, at 34-42.
27. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 20, § 1334 at 503; FED. R. Civ. P. 11
advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 200, reprinted in 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS,
supra note 20, § 11.01[4] at 11-7.
It would appear that only in "rare circumstances" did the federal courts rely
solely on former Rule 11 in awarding attorneys' fees. Note, supra note 26, at 120.
Between 1950 and 1976 only one such case was reported. Risinger, supra note 20,
at 37 n.123. See Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 365 F.
Supp. 975, 983 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (attorneys' fees imposed under Rule 11 against
plaintiffs' attorney who failed to investigate properly factual basis of allegations
before filing a complaint against incorrectly named defendants). Following Kinee,
other federal courts used former Rule 11 to impose sanctions. See, e.g., Hedison
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 643 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1981) (frivolous complaint); Anderson
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 684 (9th Cir. 1980) (refiling time-barred com-
plaint); Lucha, Inc. v. Goeglein, 575 F.Supp. 785, 788 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (frivolous
motion to dismiss).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 198 (citing R.
RODES, H. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 64-65 (Federal Judicial Center 1981)). Judge
Schwarzer has flatly stated that "[w]idespread concern over frivolous litigation
and abusive practices of attorneys" led to the 1983 amendments to Rule 11.
Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 181.
[Vol. 9:11
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III. 1983 AMENDMENTS TO RULE 1
A. An Overview of the Rule
Effective August 1, 1983 Rule 11 was amended. 29 The follow-
ing reprint features the new material in italics and the portions of
the former rule which were deleted in brackets:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party repre-
sented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of
record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A
party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his plead-
ing, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity
that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by
the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by cor-
roborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attor-
ney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowl-
edge, information, and belief [there is good ground to support it;
and that it is not interposed for delay] formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary de-
lay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it
is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention
of the pleader or movant. [or is signed with intent to defeat the
purpose of this rule; it may be stricken as sham and false and the
action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served.
For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if
scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.] If a pleading, motion,
or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanc-
tion, which may include an order to pay to the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.80
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 97 F.R.D. 165, 167-68, reprinted in 2A J. MOORE & J.
LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.01[3] at 11-4.
30. Id. at 196-97.
19861
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Significant amendments to the rule may be summarized as
follows:
(1) Rule 11 applies to every paper filed in court, not just
pleadings; it applies to attorneys as well as parties;3'
(2) The Rule mandates "reasonable prefiling inquiry" by coun-
sel "with respect to the facts and the law on which the paper is
based";3"
31. As noted above (see supra note 18) 28 U.S.C. § 1927 applies only to attor-
neys. In its former version, Rule 11 similarly authorized the imposition of sanc-
tions only against attorneys (see supra note 20). As the Advisory Committee com-
mented on this change in Rule 11 applicability:
If the duty imposed by the rule is violated, the court should have the
discretion to impose sanctions on either the attorney, the party the sign-
ing attorney represents, or both, or on an unrepresented party who
signed the pleading, and the new rule so provides. Although Rule 11 has
been silent on the point, courts have claimed the power to impose sanc-
tions on an attorney personally, either by imposing costs or employing
the contempt technique. . . .This power has been used infrequently.
The amended rule should eliminate any doubt as to the propriety of as-
sessing sanctions against the attorney.
Even though it is the attorney whose signature violates the rule, it
may be appropriate under the circumstances of the case to impose a
sanction on the client. . . . This modification brings Rule 11 in line with
practice under Rule 37, which allows sanctions for abuses during discov-
ery to be imposed upon the party, the attorney, or both.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 200, reprinted in 2A J.
MOORE & L. LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.01[4] at 11-7 (citations omitted).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 185. The Advisory
Committee offered the following explication of this requirement:
The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both
the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule.
The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances ....
This standard is more stringent than the original good-faith formula and
thus it is expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its
violation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 198-99, reprinted in 2A J.
MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.01[4] at 11-5 (citations omitted). See also
Note, Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule 11-Is the Stop, Look and Investigate Re-
quirement a Litigant's Roadblock?, 18 IND. L. REV. 751 (1985).
The "prefiling inquiry" requirement may be violated if the attorney fails to
adequately investigate the facts of the case, see, e.g., Florida Monument Builders
v. All Faiths Memorial Gardens, 605 F. Supp. 1324, 1326-27 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (fail-
ure to conduct independent investigation before alleging statewide antitrust con-
spiracy involving nearly fifty cemeteries); Weisman v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724,
725 (D.D.C. 1984) (filing a complaint that revealed on its face a lack of complete
diversity of citizenship between all defendants and all plaintiffs); Viola Sportwear,
Inc. v. Mimun, 574 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (Rule 11 sanctions of
[Vol. 9:11
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(3) The Rule specifies that the papers filed must be "well
grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith ar-
gument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing
law";33
(4) The Rule requires a certification that the paper "is not in-
terposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
$20,000 in attorneys' fees imposed upon plaintiff and its attorneys for alleging a
nationwide trademark conspiracy based on the sale of a Single pair of designer
jeans for ten dollars), or for failure to research the law adequately, see, e.g., Rod-
gers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 13, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (failure to
research case properly before filing civil rights action), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th
Cir. 1985). See also, Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 86 (1986) (attorney has duty to screen claims for
factual veracity and legal sufficiency); Smith v. United Transp. Union Local No.
81, 594 F. Supp. 96, 101 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (gross negligence in research and inquiry
requires imposition of sanctions).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 185. In the words of
the Advisory Committee:
The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in
pursuing factual or legal theories. The court is expected to avoid using
the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by inquir-
ing what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or
other paper was submitted. Thus, what constitutes a reasonable inquiry
may depend on such factors as how much time for investigation was
available to the signer; whether he had to rely on a client for information
as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper; whether
the pleading, motion, or other paper was based on a plausible view of the
law; or whether he depended on forwarding counsel or another member
of the bar.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 199, reprinted in 2A J.
MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.01[4] at 11-5. Applying this principle, the
court in Van Dorn Co. v. Howington, 623 F. Supp. 1548, 1560 (N.D. Ohio 1985),
denied defendants' motion for sanctions because the parties were litigating an ac-
tion "in an area of the law [civil racketeering] that is not well settled." Cf. Davis
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 707, 717 (W.D. La. 1986) (court would
not impose sanctions against plaintiffs for bringing a time-barred civil RICO ac-
tion where the pertinent limitations period is "yet unsettled"). Notwithstanding
the specific language used by the Advisory Committee, one commentator has
stated that the effect of amended Rule 11 is that judges discourage frivolous
claims at the expense of stifling legitimate legal innovation by sanctioning argu-
ments on the erroneous assumption that a bright line separates warranted from
unwarranted legal theories. Synder, The Chill of Rule 11, 11 LITIGATION 16, 55
(Winter 1985). See also Note, Reasonable Inquiry under Rule 11-Is the Stop,
Look and Investigate Requirement a Litigant's Roadblock? 18 IND. L. REv 751
(1985) (amended Rule 11 may have effect of chilling willingness to bring innova-
tive civil actions).
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unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation";"'
(5) The court may impose sanctions for violations of the Rule
"upon motion or upon its own initiative"; 35
(6) If a violation of the Rule is found, the court "shall impose
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note
("[gireater attention by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the
imposition of sanctions when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive
tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims
or defenses", FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 198, re-
printed in 2 J. MOORE & J. LucAs, supra note 20, § 11.01141, at 11-5).
In several cases the courts, after finding that the attorney breached the "rea-
sonable inquiry" standard, concluded that the conduct was such that it was moti-
vated by an "improper purpose." See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Western Cas. & Sur.
Co., 105 F.R.D. 624, 626 (S.D. Ala. 1985) (dilatory filing of removal petition). See
generally Note, supra note 26, at 128-29.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Regarding the courts' ability to impose sanctions upon
their own initiative the Advisory Committee commented:
Courts currently appear to believe they may impose sanctions on
their own motion. . . . Authority to do so has been made explicit in order
to overcome the traditional reluctance of courts to intervene unless re-
quested by one of the parties. The detection and punishment of a viola-
tion of the signing requirement, encouraged by the amended rule, is part
of the court's responsibility for securing the system's effective operation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 200, reprinted in 2A J.
MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.01[4] at 11-6 to 11-7 (citations omitted).
Procedural considerations regarding Rule 11 motions include the following:
A party seeking sanctions should give notice to the court and the
offending party promptly upon discovering a basis for doing so. The time
when sanctions are to be imposed rests in the discretion of the trial
judge. However, it is anticipated that in the case of pleadings the sanc-
tions issue under Rule 11 normally will be determined at the end of the
litigation, and in the case of motions at the time when the motion is
decided or shortly thereafter. The procedure obviously must comport
with due process requirements. The particular format to be followed
should depend on the circumstances of the situation and the severity of
the sanction under consideration. In many situations the judge's partici-
pation in the proceedings provides him with full knowledge of the rele-
vant facts and little further inquiry will be necessary.
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective oper-
ation of the pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite
litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the court must to the extent
possible limit the scope of sanction proceedings to the record. Thus, dis-
covery should be conducted only by leave of the court, and then only in
extraordinary circumstances.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 200-01, reprinted in 2A J.
MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.01[4] at 11-7.
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. . . an appropriate sanction"; 3 and
(7) Appropriate sanctions may include an order to pay to the
opposing party "the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
[because of the filing of the pleading or other paper] including a
reasonable attorney's fee."
'3 7
B. General Application of Rule 11
As noted above, Rule 11 applies to every pleading, motion and
other paper of a party8 filed in federal civil litigation. 9 If a party
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added). As noted above (see supra text ac-
companying notes 26-27) experience had proven that sanctions were infrequently
imposed under the former version of Rule 11. The 1983 amendments to the Rule
were seemingly designed to force the district courts' hands:
The text of the amended rule seeks to dispel apprehensions that efforts
to obtain enforcement will be fruitless by insuring that the rule will be
applied when properly invoked. The word "sanctions" in the caption, for
example, stresses a deterrent orientation in dealing with improper plead-
ings, motions or other papers. This corresponds to the approach in im-
posing sanctions for discovery abuses . . . . And the words "shall im-
pose" in the last sentence focus the court's attention on the need to
impose sanctions for pleading and motion abuses. The court, however,
retains the necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of
the rule. It has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the
case, with which it should be well acquainted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 199-200, reprinted in 2A
J. MOORE & J. LucAs, § 11.01[4] at 11-6 (citation omitted).
Once a determination is made that Rule 11 has been violated, the court is
obliged to impose sanctions. See Weisman v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724, 726 (D.D.C.
1985); Wold v. Mineral Engineering Co., 575 F. Supp. 166, 167 (D. Colo. 1984).
See also Note, supra note 26, at 141 (failure of judges to ignore clear directives of
Rule 11 may undermine the rule's effectiveness and defeat the drafter's intent);
Schwarter, supra note 6, at 201 (judges have duty to enforce Rule 11 even if it is
an unpleasant experience).
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
38. The term "other paper of a party" contained in Rule 11 includes notices
and replies to motions, briefs, memoranda of law, reports and other papers re-
quired or permitted by local rule or court order. 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra
note 20, § 11.021] at 11-8 n.2. One circuit court has cautioned, however, that
other rules should be invoked where more appropriate. Zaldivar v. City of Los
Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1986); see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (excessive
discovery requests); FED. R. Civ. P. 56(g) (inappropriate summary judgment
affidavits).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. It should be noted that there is no counterpart to Rule
11 in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, hence, Rule 11 is seemingly not
applicable to appeals. See Thiem v. Hertz Corp., 732 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir.
1984) (notice of appeal not signed by counsel in accordance with Rule 11 during
19861
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is represented by counsel, the requisite subscription must be made
by at least one attorney of record in his own name and the rule
operates by giving effect to the signature of the attorney.40
Judge Schwarzer, cognizant of the realities of modern federal
practice, has stated that Rule 11 sanctions should be directed at
the attorney who is "responsible" for the offending paper."' This
jurist would absolve from blame the innocent law firm associate
who violates the rule while following a partner's instructions"' and
in other situations would inquire into the role played by local
counsel in preparing the offending paper.43
period for appeals was nevertheless sufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction). Ac-
cord 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.02[1] at 118 to 11-9 n.5 (term-
ing it "doubtful" whether Rule 11 is applicable to appellate proceedings). In Han-
sen v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 788 F.2d 892, 894 (2d Cir. 1986), the Second Circuit
flatly stated that the provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 11 are not applicable to appel-
late proceedings.
Under the provisions of FED. R. App. P. 38, however, the courts of appeals
may award "just damages and single or double costs" to the appellee if it is deter-
mined that an appeal is "frivolous." See generally 9 J. Moore, B. WARD & J. Lu-
CAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 238.02 (1985).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
41. Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 186.
42. Judge Schwarzer writes:
The person signing the paper may not necessarily be the one responsible
for it. An associate in a law firm charged with preparing a paper for filing
may be carrying out the instructions of a partner who made the decision
to file it. In such a situation, sanctions are more appropriately imposed
on the principal rather than the agent carrying out his orders, and noth-
ing in the rule bars its application in that manner.
Id. at 185.
43. Judge Schwarzer analogizes the innocent associate to local counsel in fed-
eral litigation:
A similar problem may arise when a paper is signed and filed by
local counsel at the direction of out-of-state counsel. Local counsel may
be called on to share in the preparation of a paper and in the decision to
file it. On the other hand, a client may find it more economical to place*
responsibility on an out-of-state firm which will use local counsel only as
a conduit for papers and communications. Rule 11 is not intended to
increase the cost of litigation by requiring review of papers by an addi-
tional set of lawyers. What the rule does require is that the lawyer who
elects to sign a paper take responsibility for it, even if that responsibility
is shared. Where control of the litigation rests with other lawyers, there-
fore, local counsel may be well advised to let one of those lawyers sign
papers to be filed.
Even if the paper is signed by out-of-state counsel, however, the
presence of the name of local counsel or his firm on the paper raises an
[Vol. 9:11
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C. Requisite Pre-Filing Inquiry
Under amended Rule 11, the person'4 signing the pleading,
inference that he has authorized or at least concurred in its filing. It
would be difficult for a lawyer to disclaim all responsibility for a paper
bearing his name. Rule 11 may therefore make it advisable for attorneys
acting as local counsel to consider the extent to which they can perform
the role of a passive conduit consistent with the responsibilities the rule
imposes.
Id. at 186. (footnote omitted).
In Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D.
Cal. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, No. 84-2602 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1986), a Rule 11
motion proceeding arising out of defendant's filing of a frivolous motion for sum-
mary judgment, the court imposed sanctions only upon out-of-state lead counsel
who were responsible for its preparation. Local counsel, who had signed the mo-
tion but did not actively participate in its preparation or the decision to file, were
criticized but not subjected to sanctions. Id. at 125 n.1. Compare Coburn Optical
Indus. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 660 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (local counsel's firm
held liable for Rule 11 sanctions where it "seemed blindly to follow the commands
of its out-of-state associates who in all probability prepared most, if not all, of the
[offending] motion").
In Long v. Quantex Resources, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), where
local counsel relied upon foreign counsel before signing papers and representing
them to the court, the district court imposed sanctions against local counsel when
the argument advanced in the papers was subsequently abandoned. Judge Owens
there commented:
It therefore seems to me that at the very least, a local counsel that signs
the papers of foreign counsel must read the papers, and from that have a
basis for a good faith belief that the papers on their face appear to be
warranted by the facts asserted and the legal arguments made, and are
not interposed for any improper purpose.
Id. at 417. Cf. Pravic v. U.S. Industries-Clearing, 109 F.R.D. 620, 623 (E.D. Mich.
1986) (attorney may not rely upon legal memorandum prepared by second lawyer
without independently verifying the reasoning of the cases in the memorandum
and "Shepardizing" those cases).
44. Under Rule 11 a person appearing pro se must sign the papers he files
and the rule "gives the same effect to his signature as to that of an attorney."
Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 185 n.17. The courts have recognized that Rule 11
applies to pro se litigants, see Cavallary v. Lakewood Sky Diving Center, 623 F.
Supp. 242, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Pawlowske v. Chrysler Corp., 623 F. Supp. 569,
572-73 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Bigalk v. Fed. Land Bank Ass'n of Rochester, 107 F.R.D.
210, 213 (D. Minn. 1985); Blume v. Leake, 618 F. Supp. 95, 97 (D. Idaho 1985),
and have not hesitated to impose sanctions against them. See, e.g., Fox v.
Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming imposition of sanctions to-
taling $4,000 against attorney who filed frivolous pro se action); Cannon v. Loyola
Univ. of Chicago, 784 F.2d 777, 782 (7th Cir. 1986) (sanctions imposed against pro
se litigant whose ten-year "penchant for litigation" constituted harassment of de-
fendants); Smith v. Egger, 108 F.R.D. 44, 45 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (filing frivolous tax-
1,9861
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motion, or other paper certifies that "to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and . . . law . . . ."" Hence, there is an affirma-
tive duty placed upon the attorney or party to investigate the facts
and the law prior to signing and filing the paper."6 The failure to
do so may subject them to sanctions under Rule 11. For example,
in Goldman v. Belden"7 where plaintiff alleged fraud on the part of
defendant without having first conducted a proper inquiry, the
court dismissed the complaint and then considered whether Rule
11 sanctions would properly be imposed against plaintiff and his
attorney. Noting that the slightest investigation by plaintiff's at-
torney would have clearly disclosed the insubstantiality of the
fraud allegations, the court imposed sanctions of $2,500 against
plaintiff and his attorney. The court recognized that the standard
for imposing sanctions prior to the August 1983 amendments to
Rule 11 was whether the action was commenced in "good faith."
Judge Schwarzer stated, however, that "[t]he new standard is
much stricter and permits the imposition of sanctions for failure
by the attorney to make reasonable prefiling inquiry into the facts
and the law of the case. ''48
payer's suit earns pro se plaintiff sanctions of $3,743.36); Williams v. Duckworth,
617 F. Supp. 597, 601-02 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (prisoner fined $300 for filing frivolous
civil rights suit); Nixon v. Phillipoff, 615 F. Supp. 890, 897-98 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
(frivolous suit arising out of mortgage foreclosure earns pro se litigant sanctions
of $2,750). Accord Johnson v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 347, 349-50 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (frivolous taxpayer's suit).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added). See supra note 31.
46. Professor Arthur Miller has described this as a "stop-and-think obliga-
tion." A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBIL-
iTY (Federal Judicial Center 1984). Accord Stewart v. RCA Corp., 790 F.2d 624,
633 (7th Cir. 1986) (Rule 11 requires attorneys to think first and file later);
Duncan v. WJLA-TV, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 4, 5-6 (D.D.C. 1984); Sealtite Corp. v. Gen.
Serv. Admin., 614 F. Supp. 352, 355 (D. Colo. 1985). See also Rothschild, Rule 11:
Stop, Think and Investigate, 11 LITIGATION 13 (1985).
47. 580 F. Supp. 1373 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 754 F.2d
1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
48. 580 F. Supp. at 1381 (footnote omitted). An excellent elucidation of the
type of pre-filing "reasonable inquiry" required under Rule 11 may be found in
Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 186-89. See also 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note
20, § 11.02[2] at 11-11 to 11-15.
In Wagner v. Allied Chem. Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Md. 1985), the court
held that consulting with an expert, talking to former employees of defendant's
pesticide plant about their disabilities and receiving an oral opinion from a doctor
[Vol. 9:11
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A number of district courts have imposed sanctions because of
counsel's failure to conduct the type of prefiling inquiry mandated
by the rule.49 For example, in Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles,50 an
action brought under the Voting Rights Act,51 the court held that
intervenors were entitled to attorneys' fees and costs of $14,951.25
under Rule 11 because the complaint was not well-grounded in law
or fact. Senior Judge Williams excoriated plaintiffs counsel and
pointed out the broad public policy which the rule is designed to
serve:
Plaintiff's arguments are so without merit that their claim can be
who had examined most of the former employees was sufficient inquiry on the
part of plaintiff's counsel to avoid the imposition of sanctions. Id. at 1411-12.
49. See, e.g., Brown v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 72, 73 (S.D.
Miss. 1986) (sanctions of $1,000 imposed against attorney who filed frivolous bad
faith action against insurance company); Advo Systems, Inc., 110 F.R.D. 426, 432-
33 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (sanctions totaling $5,821 imposed under Rule 11 against
employer and employer's attorney who brought frivolous tort suit against former
employee); Barrios v. Pelham Marine, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 512, 514 (E.D. La. 1985)
(sanctions of $750 imposed against defense counsel who filed frivolous third-party
complaint); Gilmer v. City of Cleveland, 617 F. Supp. 985, 989 (N.D. Ohio 1985)
(sanctions of $2,000 imposed against counsel who filed frivolous civil rights suit);
Steele v. Morris, 608 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (defendant who filed
frivolous motion to dismiss ordered to pay $337.50 in attorneys' fees); Nat'l Sur-
vival Game, Inc. v. Skirmish, U.S.A., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 339, 341-42 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (in action based upon unfair competition claim court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss and, on its own motion, ordered defense counsel to bear plain-
tiff's costs relating to the motion; defense counsel failed to conduct reasonable
inquiry required by Rule 11 where they failed to cite a single authority in support
of their position and ignored established precedent directly to the contrary);
Kuzmins v. Employee Transfer Corp., 587 F. Supp. 536, 538 (N.D. Ohio 1984)
(same-counsel for plaintiff in sex discrimination action ordered to pay $100 to
defense counsel); Hasty v. Paccar, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1577, 1580 (E.D. Mo. 1984)
(in view of plaintiff's "utter failure" to come forward with even the slightest con-
nection between a corporate defendant and Missouri so as to satisfy that state's
long-arm statute, district court invited defendant to file a Rule 11 motion);
Booker v. City of Atlanta, 586 F. Supp. 340, 341 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (city attorneys
who asserted a frivolous argument regarding civil rights immunity held liable for
payment of fees and costs); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Machinery, 581 F.
Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn. 1984); (counsel for plaintiff hit with $2,894.62 in sanc-
tions for failing to determine that products liability case was time-barred before
signing complaint and for thereafter failing to dismiss it after learning that it was
untimely).
50. 590 F. Supp. 852 (C.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1982). In Zaldivar plaintiff supporters of a city
councilman brought the action against the city contending that a recall election
violated the Act. Zaldivar, 590 F. Supp. at 854.
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deemed frivolous. The statutes upon which they base their claim
clearly do not provide support. A cursory reading of the statutes
would indicate to a reasonable person that there is no basis for
bringing this lawsuit . . . . Rule 11 proscribes the filing of claims
such as the one before this Court even though not brought in sub-
jective bad faith. Counsel should not file actions not well founded
in fact and law because the end result is the burdening of an al-
ready crowded docket and the incurring of unnecessary legal ex-
penses for the parties involved. The best means of ensuring this is
to impose sanctions."
On the other hand, plaintiff's counsel who conducts (and can docu-
52. Zaldivar, 590 F. Supp. at 857. The court ordered plaintiffs and their at-
torneys to share the burden of paying intervenors' fees and costs:
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 states that where the cir-
cumstances are appropriate, the court may impose a sanction on the cli-
ent as well as the attorney. Implicit in that provision is that both parties
may share the burden of satisfying the sanction. The circumstances at-
tendant to this case indicate that both counsel and their clients should
share the burden of paying Intervenors' attorney's fees and costs. It is
reasonable to conclude that plaintiffs were aware of the legal defects in
the claim filed in their behalf. The same claim was raised in state court
and it was dismissed. In addition, plaintiffs appear to be ready and will-
ing parties in an effort to stall the recall petition process initiated by
Intervenors. Every attempt in state court to derail the recall process
failed and plaintiffs made a last ditch effort in this court. The Court can-
not allow the judicial system to be used for such purposes when there is
neither a factual nor legal basis for the claim.
Id.
As noted above (see supra note 49), on appeal the district court's decision in
Zaldivar imposing sanctions under Rule 11 was reversed. Zaldivar v. City of Los
Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986). Reviewing Judge Williams' decision de
novo, the Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs had a "good faith" claim under
the Voting Rights Act and that their suit was neither "frivolous" nor brought for
purposes of "harassment" in violation of Rule 11. Id at 833-35. It is submitted
that the reversal of Judge Williams' Zaldivar decision represents the subjective
nature of applying Rule 11 standards and indicates the difficulty in predicting
when sanctions might be imposed in a particular case.
This problem is exacerbated when different courts seemingly apply different
standards and accordingly reach inconsistent conclusions regarding the same con-
duct. Compare Donaldson v. Clark, 105 F.R.D. 526 (M.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 786 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1986) (application of objective standard
in case where spouse and judges accused of civil rights conspiracy in divorce pro-
ceeding results in Rule 11 violation) with Williams v. Birzon, 576 F. Supp. 577
(W.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 740 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1984) (application of subjective
standard where spouse alleged civil rights violated in divorce suit by conspiracy
between spouses and state court judges results in no Rule 11 violation).
[Vol. 9:11
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ment) an adequate investigation into the facts and law of a case
before filing suit will not be subjected to sanctions. 3
The reasonableness of an attorney's belief is assessed "in light
of the circumstances at the time the paper is signed."54 In some
cases, however, an attorney's belief that there was a reasonable ba-
sis for the paper when it was filed may well change in light of later
developments, such as revelations in discovery, which may render a
claim or defense untenable. Judge Schwarzer has written that "[t]o
persist in claims or defenses beyond a point where they could no
longer be considered well-grounded in fact may violate . . . [Rule
11]."55 For example, in Woodfork v. Gavin,6 a wrongful death ac-
tion where the issue was whether a state court suit or a federal
court action would have priority under Mississippi law, 57 sanctions
were sought by an intervenor law firm (counsel for plaintiff in the
53. See Fisher Bros. v. Cambridge-Lee Indus. Inc., 585 F. Supp. 69, 71-72
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (antitrust action). See generally Sanctions, supra note 2, at 9-11
(listing practical suggestions to avoid Rule 11 sanctions). See also infra note 115.
The Advisory Committee observed that "what constitutes a reasonable in-
quiry may depend on such factors as how much time for investigation was availa-
ble to the signer; whether he had to rely on a client for information as to the facts
underlying the paper ... ; or whether he depended on forwarding counsel or an-
other member of the bar." Advisory Committee Notes to Amended Rule 11, 97
F.R.D. at 199, reprinted in 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.01141, at
11-5. See Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 187-88.
54. Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 189. The Advisory Committee Notes state
that the court "is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test
the signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the
pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted." Advisory Committee Notes to
Amended Rule 11, 97 F.R.D. at 199, reprinted in 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra
note 20, § 11.01[41 at 11-5. It should be noted that the 1983 amendments may not
be applicable to cases filed before their effective date. See Hashemi v. Cam-
paigner Publications, Inc., 784 F.2d 1581, 1583-84 (11th Cir. 1986) (amended Rule
11 not applicable to defamation complaint filed before amendments' effective
date).
55. Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 189. See Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 107 F.R.D. 112, 115 (E.D.N.C. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 789 F.2d 1056
(4th Cir. 1986).
56. 105 F.R.D. 100 (N.D. Miss. 1985).
57. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1984) provides that there shall be only
one pending suit for the same wrongful death and that that action shall ensue for
the benefit of all beneficiaries. Upon the filing of a wrongful death suit, other
claimants must join in that suit rather than file separate actions. Woodfork, 105
F.R.D. at 102 n.1. The dispute in Woodfork arose out of a state court suit filed on
August 2, 1983 and a federal action filed six days later by other beneficiaries of
the decedent. Id. at 102-03.
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earlier filed state court suit) against attorneys representing the
plaintiff in the subsequently filed federal court suit. The latter had
alleged that the former had obtained priority by acting through
"fraud, collusion, misrepresentation, and an alteration of court
records" to procure an incorrect (and earlier) filing date in the
state court suit.5 8 Even after deposition testimony had revealed
that their allegations were incorrect, plaintiff's attorneys in the
federal court suit did not retract their assertions. In holding that
sanctions would properly be assessed against them under both
Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927,"9 Judge Biggers concluded that
plaintiff's attorneys had failed to make an adequate investigation
of the facts before leveling their charges and had been remiss in
failing to abandon their position when it became clear that it was
untenable:
The recent amendment to Rule 11, which was in effect at the
time the plaintiff's attorneys made their allegations of fraud, re-
quires reasonable inquiry rather than the lesser standard of good
faith. The court believes that this rule as amended obligates an
attorney who signs a document not only to conduct a reasonable
investigation into the facts before filing, but also to continually
review, examine, and re-evaluate his position as the facts of the
case come to light. If an attorney subsequently becomes aware of
information or evidence which reasonably leads him to believe
that there is no factual or legal basis for his position, giving due
regard to the standard of proof, then that attorney is under an
obligation to re-evaluate the earlier certification of the cause
under Rule 11.60
58. Id. at 103.
59. In the words of Judge Biggers:
This court determines that the plaintiffs attorneys, Mr. Johnnie E.
Walls and Mr. Robert E. Buck, did not discharge the duties and stan-
dard of care imposed upon them as attorneys at law and officers of this
court either at the time they filed the response to the motion to dismiss
or in the unjustified maintenance of their position. The court finds that
they violated both the spirit and letter of Rule 11, and that their asser-
tion of the affirmative defense contained in the response to the defend-
ants' motion was with such reckless disregard as to truth or falsity that
the pleading violates the prohibition of 28 U.S.C § 1927 against vexatious
litigation.
Id. at 106.
60. Id. at 104. See also Olga's Kitchen of Hayward, Inc. v. Papo, 108 F.R.D.
695 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (Rule 11 sanctions including attorneys' fees of $15,911.25
imposed against defendant and his counsel for the manner in which they con-
ducted their defense in a landlord-tenant dispute); Weir v. Lehman Newspapers,
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It is clear, therefore, that the duty under Rule 11 to make a "rea-
sonable inquiry" is a continuing one.
D. Applicable Standard of Care
Under amended Rule 11 the attorney (or party) signing the
paper must certify that it is "well grounded in fact" and warranted
by existing law or "a good faith argument for the extension, modi-
fication, or reversal of existing law.""' Although the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes state that the rule is "not intended to chill an attor-
ney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal
theories,"62 it has been suggested that Rule 11 could be used to
stifle the creative development of the law. 3
In applying the former version of the rule, the courts followed
what has been termed "a somewhat nebulous good faith stan-
dard. ' 64 In other words, prior to August 1, 1983 sanctions would be
imposed under Rule 11 if an action was brought in "bad faith,
6 5
Inc., 105 F.R.D. 574, 576 (D. Colo. 1985); (attorney required to pay attorney fees
since the plaintiff failed to raise a federal question and complaint was a duplica-
tion of a state court action based on an identical complaint); Coburn Optical In-
dus. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 660 (M.D.N.C. 1985) ("To persist in claims or
defenses beyond a point where they can no longer be considered well grounded
violates Rule 11").
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. As noted above (see supra note 31) courts have found
Rule 11 violations where an attorney misstates, misrepresents, or omits pertinent
law, see Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 128-29
(N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, No. 84-2602 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1986);
where an attorney fails to research legal precedent adequately, see Heuttig &
Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519, 1522 (N.D.
Cal. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986); or where the claim is clearly un-
supported by precedent, see Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 596 F. Supp.
13, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985). See generally Note,
supra note 26, at 131-33.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 199, reprinted in
2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.01[4] at 11-5.
63. See supra note 33.
64. 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.02[2] at 11-13. The courts
applying amended Rule 11 have, in most cases, recognized that good faith is no
longer relevant. See Foster v. Michelin Tire Corp., 108 F.R.D. 412, 415 (C.D. Ill.
1985); Interior Finish Contractors Ass'n v. Drywall Finishers Local No. 1955, 625
F. Supp. 1233, 1241 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
65. See Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) (court of ap-
peals reversed district court's award of attorneys' fees to defendants, holding that
the action was not entirely without foundation and therefore was not commenced
in "bad faith"). Accord Hashemi v. Campaigner Publications., Inc., 784 F.2d 1581,
1583 (11th Cir. 1986); Rubin v. Buckman, 727 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1984); Gieringer
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meaning that it was "entirely without color" and asserted "wan-
tonly, for the purpose of harassment or delay, or other improper
reasons."6" The new standard was expressed by Judge Knapp in
the following terms:
The question therefore presented under Rule 11 is: must
there be a finding of subjective bad faith before sanctions may be
applied? It seems to us that the question answers itself. Given the
nature of advocacy it would be well nigh impossible ever to estab-
lish that an advocate acted in "subjective bad faith." If that were
the criteria the Rule might as well be repealed. We think there-
fore, that the Rule must mean that the Court may impose sanc-
tions where it finds that there is no objective basis for an attor-
ney's belief that a motion is "well-grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification or reversal of existing law."'6 7
While all circuit courts addressing the issue have endorsed the ob-
jective standard embraced by Judge Knapp,68 until recently the
v. Silverman, 731 F.2d 1272, 1281 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying pre-amendment
standard).
66. Tedeschi v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co. Inc., 579 F. Supp. 657,
661 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying pre-amendment standard), aff'd, 757 F.2d 465 (2d
Cir. 1985). For example, in Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
sanctions of $200 were imposed against counsel for a mother whose child had
been taken out of the country by his natural father without her consent. The
mother sued the State Department and the Secretary of State for negligently fail-
ing to enforce a federal statute making it unlawful for a citizen to leave the
United States without a passport. The court found the action to be "frivolous"
and "completely lacking in merit." Id. at 158.
67. Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co., 101 F.R.D. 358, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (em-
phasis in original) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11) (footnote omitted). In a footnote
following the words "might well be repealed," Judge Knapp offered the following
cogent comment: "Having been many years at the Bar before being on the Bench,
we know from our own experience that there is no position-no matter how ab-
surb-of which an advocate cannot convince himself." Wells, 101 F.R.D. at 359
n.3. Judge Knapp there imposed sanctions against defense counsel who improvi-
dently filed a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 359. After the case was set-
tled, however, the court held that an award of attorneys' fees was no longer ap-
propriate. Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co, 106 F.R.D. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
68. See Stites v. I.R.S., 793 F.2d 618, 620 (5th Cir. 1986) ("in addition to a
subjective, good faith belief that the pleading is well founded in both fact and
law" Rule 11 "now requires that the belief be objectively reasonable."); See Ste-
vens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of North Carolina, 789 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th
Cir. 1986) ("a court must judge the attorney's conduct under an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness rather than by assessing subjective intent. . . ."); Lieb v.
Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 57 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); Zaldivar v. City of Los
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situation in the Seventh Circuit could best be described as "con-
fused." In two post-1983 cases 9 the Seventh Circuit maintained
that the appropriate criterion for an award of attorneys' fees under
Rule 11 is a finding of subjective bad faith.7 0 Although the two
cases were decided after August 1, 1983, the court was judging con-
duct occurring before the amendment to the rule, hence, applica-
tion of the former7 1 standard was proper. A broader reading of
these decisions, however, suggested confusion surrounding the ap-
propriate standard. In Suslick the Seventh Circuit quoted the
amended version of the rule 2 and then stated that it "requires a
finding of subjective bad faith . . . ., Whether the court's use of
the present tense represented a typographical error or not, the
Suslick decision caused confusion in that circuit.74 To a certain de-
Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986) ("subjective bad faith is not an element
to be proved under present Rule 11 . . . ."); Laborista v. Cerveceria India, Inc.,
778 F.2d 65, 66 (1st Cir. 1985) (same); Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v.
Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 1985) ("subjective bad faith is no longer a
predicate to a Rule 11 violation; the test is now an objective one of reasonable-
ness."); Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177,
181 (7th Cir. 1985); Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Moore v. City of Des Moines, 766 F.2d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 1985); Eastway Constr.
Co. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1985); Maier v. Orr, 758
F.2d 1578, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
69. Gieringer v. Silverman, 731 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1984); Suslick v. Roths-
child Securities Corp., 741 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1984).
70. Gieringer, 731 F.2d at 1281; Suslick, 741 F.2d at 1007.
71. See Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir.
1983). See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
72. Suslick, 741 F.2d at 1003 n.3.
73. Id. at 1007 (emphasis added).
74. Compare In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 497 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Shadur,
J.) ("This Court does not view itself as bound by the Suslick mistaken footnote
citation.") with Davis v. United States, 104 F.R.D. 509, 512 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(Hart, J.) ("it is clear that Suslick itself was interpreting the amended version of
Rule 11 . . .and this court is bound by that interpretation"). Judge Schwarzer
has rejected any sort of bad faith formulation:
To test compliance with the rule, as some courts have done, by reference
to whether bad faith has been shown is inconsistent with its text and
purpose. The Advisory Committee Notes point out that "the standard is
more stringent than the original good-faith formula and thus it is ex-
pected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation;"
wilfullness as a prerequisite to disciplinary action was deleted by the
1983 amendment which "is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to
impose sanctions ... by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney
and reenforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions." Rea-
sonable belief that a paper is "warranted by law" should therefore be
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gree, disparity of standards persists in other courts as well."
It should be noted that, notwithstanding the standard which
they are applying, federal judges are not imposing sanctions with-
treated as an objective standard turning on the facts and circumstances
of the case, not on the attorney's state of mind.
Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 191 (footnotes omitted).
The Seventh Circuit seemingly got back on the right track when it recognized
the objective standard in Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1986);
Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 181 (7th
Cir. 1985); Frazier v. Cast, 771 F.2d 259, 265 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985); and Rodgers v.
Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 205 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Pawlowske v.
Chrysler Corp., 623 F. Supp. 569, 572 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (objective standard fol-
lowed); Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co., 621 F. Supp. 1547, 1566 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(same); Sloan v. United States, 621 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (same).
Commentary on the Seventh Circuit's tortuous trdil may be found in Note, supra
note 26, at 124-25.
75. Consider the hybrid standard formulated by one district judge:
Turning now to the motion of the plaintiff for sanctions, which motion
has been exhaustively supported by the briefs and supporting documents
furnished by plaintiff, the court, being fully apprised of the amendments
to Rule 11, and the cases which have come down since that amendment,
nonetheless does not conclude that this case justifies the sanctions pro-
vided for in that rule. It is certainly true that the case has involved a
good deal of the court's time, that the defenses asserted, when properly
analyzed by consideration of the record, simply do not defend against the
claim of the plaintiff, but it cannot be said objectively that these de-
fenses have been asserted in bad faith. It is agreed that the test is not
subjective bad faith, but objective bad faith. Accepting the objective
standard, the court is not able to conclude with sufficient clarity that the
assertions of these defenses were objectively in bad faith. As a conse-
quence, the motion for sanctions is denied.
Ancona v. Umstadter, No. 84-0025-C (W.D. Va. Jan. 28, 1985), aff'd on other
grounds, No. 85-1470 (4th Cir. Sept. 10, 1986) (per curiam). Compare Nelson v.
Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 750 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding requirement
of bad faith in new Rule 11), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2358 (1985), with Stevens v.
Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of North Carolina, 789 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th Cir.
1986) (in applying amended Rule 11 "a court must judge the attorney's conduct
under an objective standard of reasonableness rather than by assessing subjective
intent. . . ."); See also, Parness, Groundless Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys
in the Federal Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 325, 362 & n.148 (noting continued
confusion); Kobak & Barrett, Amended Federal Rule 11 and Antitrust Litiga-
tion, N.Y.L.J. July 22, 1985, at 4, col. 1 (same); Jeffers v. Convoy Co., 636 F. Supp.
1337, 1342 (D. Minn. 1986) (apparently applying "bad faith" standard); D.G.
Rung Indus. v. Tinnerman, 626 F. Supp. 1062, 1065 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (same);
Sam & Mary Housing Corp. v. New York State, 632 F. Supp. 1448, 1452
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same); Can Am Indus. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 631 F.
Supp. 1180, 1185 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (same).
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out regard to the vagaries of counsel. While the rule mandates
sanctions for every "violation" and purports to make sanctions
mandatory by directing that in the event of a violation the court
"shall impose . . . an appropriate sanction,""9 the courts have not
imposed sanctions where an offending attorney was laboring under
a "mistake" and acknowledged the error. 77 For example, in Weis-
man v. Rivlin,78 where sanctions were imposed against plaintiff's
counsel who mistakenly filed a complaint that on its face disclosed
a lack of diversity jurisdiction, the court granted defendant's Rule
11 motion but awarded only $200 of the $7,800 requested. 9
Rule 11 as amended also authorized the court to impose sanc-
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See supra note 35.
77. See, e.g., Baranski v. Serhant, 106 F.R.D. 247, 249-50 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(plaintiff's counsel not subjected to Rule 11 sanctions where they admitted that
second and third amended complaints filed on behalf of additional plaintiffs were
time-barred). The Advisory Committee Notes specify that the court "retains the
necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule. It has discre-
tion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case, with which it should be
well acquainted." Advisory Committee Note to Amended Rule 11, 97 F.R.D.at 200,
reprinted in 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.01[41 at 11-6.
78. 598 F. Supp. 724 (D.D.C. 1984).
79. Id. at 726-27. Attention is also directed to statements made by District
Judge Brieant in denying a Rule 11 motion for sanctions arising out of plaintiff's
improper selection of venue:
While imposition of sanctions serves an essential purpose in cases
where allegations concerning the merits are unfounded or discovery is
being abused, it must be remembered that for every social benefit in liti-
gation, there is also likely to be a corresponding detriment. The detri-
ment in the case of sanctions is that the attorney or party upon whom
sanctions are imposed must justify his or her conduct in his relationships
with his or her client and his or her office colleagues. Furthermore, his or
her own self-esteem may come to be at stake, although it should not be.
These factors tend to destroy the atmosphere of friendly cooperation and
professional collegiality which should exist between opposing attorneys
in civil litigation. A cordial, professional relationship must be preserved
between attorneys if civil litigation is to be resolved promptly and fairly
on the merits and with minimum expense to society and the participants.
That this is true is shown from the fact that almost 85% of our cases are
settled prior to appellate finality. A lawyer who has been sanctioned by
the Court at the instance of an adversary is likely to be resentful toward
the adversary and counterphobic in his or her actions, therefore less ef-
fective in achieving a just settlement or in resolving those minor contro-
versies which often arise during pre-trial proceedings. The Court, and
counsel who request attorneys fees or sanctions, should remain conscious
of these fundamental truths.
Hot Locks, Inc. v. Ooh LaLa, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 751, 751-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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tions if a paper is interposed for any "improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation."' 0 For example in Heuttig & Schromm, Inc. v.
Landscape Contractors Council,s" where an employer brought a
frivolous labor law action against a union local, Judge Schwarzer
granted the local's motion for sanctions because he concluded that
the action was brought for an "improper purpose."82 Basing his de-
cision in part on the fact that the attorneys representing the em-
ployer held themselves out as specialists in labor law,83 the court
indicated that public policy comes into play when Rule 11 is
invoked:
Rule 11 is a response to a widely felt need to end abuse of
the litigation process such as occurred here. If the Court were to
tolerate this kind of conduct, the capacity of the judicial system
to serve the ends of justice would soon become impaired. Sanc-
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831-
32 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussion of meaning of the Rule 11 "improper purpose"
clause).
81. 582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
82. 582 F. Supp. at 1522.
83. After quoting the portion of the Advisory Committee Note reproduced in
supra note 32, Judge Schwarzer commented on the employer's attorneys' conduct
and experience:
Plaintiff's counsel's conduct in this case cannot be attributed to en-
thusiastic or creative advocacy of their client's cause. The fact is that
counsel knew or should have known that, at least in the matter of Local
3, their client had neither a cause of action nor any claim to invoke this
Court's jurisdiction. Attorneys do not serve the interests of their clients,
of the profession, or of society when they assert claims or defenses
grounded on nothing but tactical or strategic expediency.
As the quoted Note states, in arriving at a decision respecting sanc-
tions, the Court must take into account all of the circumstances, not lim-
ited to the abstract legal issues. One of the relevant circumstances is the
experience and standing of the attorneys in question. Counsel in this case
are not newly admitted to the bar or engaged as general practitioners not
well versed in labor law. The complaint is signed by a partner of San
Francisco firm of Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy admitted to the bar
for twelve years, and an associate of that firm seven years at the bar.
Both hold themselves out as specializing in labor law. The Littler, Men-
delson firm holds itself out as preeminent in labor law. Lawyers of that
firm appear regularly and frequently in labor litigation in this Court.
Given the claimed expertise and experience of these attorneys, a strong
inference arises that their bringing of an action such as this was for an
improper purpose.
Heuttig, 582 F. Supp. at 1522 (citation omitted).
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tions must therefore be imposed by the Court but counsel should
realize that the heaviest sanction they will suffer is the one they
have inflicted on themselves-loss of the courts' confidence in
their probity. 4
Judge Schwarzer ordered employers' counsel to pay sanctions of
$5,625 to the local and directed them to comply with two other
unique requirements. 5
E. Rule 11 Procedure
Under amended Rule 11, the court may impose sanctions ei-
ther upon the motion of the aggrieved party or upon its own mo-
tion, but it is within the court's discretion to decide the procedure,
timing and appropriateness of imposing a particular sanction."
The Advisory Committee Notes to amended Rule 11 state that in
the case of "pleadings" the issue of sanctions "normally will be de-
termined at the end of litigation" while in the case of "motions"
the propriety of imposing sanctions normally will be determined
"at the time when the motion is decided or shortly thereafter."87
The courts have indicated that due process requires that the of-
fending party be given notice and an opportunity for a hearing on
the record s but a jury trial is unnecessary.8 9 Discovery is usually
84. Id. Accord Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1985); Flem-
ing Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507, 519-20 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
85. Judge Schwarzer ordered employer's counsel to certify "that no part of
the [the sanctions] has been or will be charged to or paid, directly or indirectly"
by the employer, Huettig, 582 F. Supp. at 1522, and ordered counsel to certify to
the court that a copy of the memorandum opinion and order had been given to
each partner and associate in the firm. Id. at 1522-23.
Other cases where courts have imposed sanctions under the "improper pur-
pose" clause of Rule 11 include Pin v. Texaco, Inc., 793 F.2d 1448, 1455 (5th Cir.
1986) (frivolous federal securities claims brought to secure tactical advantage in
state court action pending in another court); Orange Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Frontline Ventures, Ltd., 792 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming sanctions of
$50,102 in attorneys' fees and $3,952 in costs against party and attorney who filed
an action in a court which lacked subject matter jurisdiction); WSB Elec. Co. v.
Rank & File Comm. to Stop the 2-Gate Sys., 103 F.R.D. 417, 420-21 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (sanctions of $6,125 in attorneys' fees imposed against counsel for employer
who filed suit for an improper purpose). See generally Schwarzer, supra note 6, at
195-97.
86. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.02[2] at
11-20; Schwarzer, supra note 6.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 200-01, reprinted
in 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 20, § 11.0114] at 11-6.
88. See Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald P.C. v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535,
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not allowed regarding a Rule 11 motion.90
In Donaldson v. Clark,"1 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals recently reversed a district court's imposition of sanctions
under Rule 11 because the offending attorney was not afforded the
procedural safeguards applicable to criminal contempt proceed-
ings.' 2 Concluding that the district court must comply in such
cases with the due process requirements set forth in Rule 42(b) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,93 the appellate court
540 (3d Cir. 1985); Hearld v. Barnes and Spectrum Emergency Care, 107 F.R.D.
17,.20 (E.D. Tex. 1985); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at
201 ("The procedure obviously must comport with due process requirements");
Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 198.
89. In re Itel Securities Litigation, 596 F. Supp. 226, 232 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
aff'd, 791 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1986).
90. See Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 775 F.2d
177, 182-83 (7th Cir. 1985) (city not entitled to discovery related to its Rule 11
motion in order to garner evidence of its opponent's motivation in filing an inter-
pleader claim). As the Advisory Committee has cautioned:
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective oper-
ation of the pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite
litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the court must to the extent
possible limit the scope of sanction proceedings to the record. Thus, dis-
covery should be conducted only by leave of the court, and then only in
extraordinary circumstances.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. at 201.
91. 786 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1986).
92. In Donaldson, the plaintiff brought a civil rights action alleging that vari-
ous county officials and private individuals had conspired to unlawfully expedite
her divorce proceeding and to restrain her from visiting and perhaps reconciling
with her husband. The district court granted defendants' motions for summary
judgment and imposed sanctions (a fine of $500) against plaintiff's attorney under
Rule 11. Donaldson v. Clark, 105 F.R.D. 526, 532 (M.D. Ga. 1985).
In reversing the district court's decision the Eleventh Circuit noted the na-
ture of certain Rule 11 proceedings:
[B]ecause of the penal and deterrent purposes of Rule 11, we hold
that there may be circumstances under which it is appropriate for a court
to impose a fine for the purpose of punishing an attorney for violating
the provisions of that rule. However, since the purpose of such a fine
would be to punish the attorney for past conduct, the fine would be in
essence a sanction in the nature of criminal contempt. Accordingly, in
such cases-where the attorney is "fined" as punishment-the court im-
posing the fine must follow the procedures as required in criminal con-
tempt proceedings.
Donaldson, 786 F.2d at 1577 (citations omitted).
93. Rule 42(b) provides in pertinent part:
A criminal contempt. . . shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall
state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the
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found the procedure followed by the lower court to be lacking."'
While Rule 11 does not require the court to prepare findings of
fact or conclusions of law, Judge Schwarzer has urged his col-
leagues to do so in order to assist the appellate review process and
assure litigants that a Rule 11 determination was the product of
thoughtful deliberation. He has also urged district courts to pub-
lish their Rule 11 decisions because this "enhances the deterrent
effect of the ruling. ' 95
As noted above, Rule 11 provides that if a pleading, motion, or
other paper is signed in violation of the rule, the court shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, in-
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee.96
preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting
the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall
be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defend-
ant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney
appointed by the Court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an
order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in
which an act of Congress so provides.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
94. In the words of Judge Johnson:
The district court in the instant case failed to afford Mr. Howard the
procedural safeguards applicable to criminal contempt proceedings. The
court did not inform Mr. Howard in advance of the specific reasons for
which he might be fined. Also, the court did not give Mr. Howard a rea-
sonable opportunity to prepare a defense against specific charges, or a
hearing at which to present such a defense. Compare Kleiner v. First
National Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985) (prior to assess-
ing fine against a party, the court gave the party notice of specific con-
duct subject to sanction and, two weeks later, held a three-day eviden-
tiary hearing on the matter). The district court thus acted improperly in
assessing the $500 fine against Mr. Howard.
Donaldson, 786 F.2d at 1577. Accord Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 (10th
Cir. 1986).
95. Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 199. Accord Kreager v. Solomon & Flanagan,
P.A., 775 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1985). See Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co. of North Carolina, 107 F.R.D. 112, 116 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (Boyle, J.) ("This
memorandum opinion is also to be published in the hope that the publication will
impress upon plaintiff's counsel and others that Rule 11 will be enforced where
appropriate"), aff'd.in part, rev'd. in part, 789 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1986).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. On the use of reprimands, see Stevens, 107 F.R.D. at
116 (plaintiff's counsel publicly reprimanded); Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 201-02
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The courts have not hesitated to impose monetary sanctions
where appropriate.9 7 There is, however, a duty to mitigate one's
damages.9 8 For example, in a recent labor case99 a union filed suit
contending that the defendant's employer had failed to arbitrate a
grievance. The district court granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment and its Rule 11 motion for sanctions but only
awarded the employer $7,500 of the $22,000 sought because of its
failure to mitigate. Noting the failure of employer's counsel to
bring the obvious factual misrepresentations contained in the
union's complaint to the court's attention through an informal sta-
tus conference, Chief Judge Peckham expounded on the duty to
mitigate:
[W]hile an informal means may not always work to dispose
of frivolous lawsuits quickly, the parties have a duty to try to re-
(discussing reprimand as appropriate sanction under Rule 11); Kassin, supra note
7, at 40 (finding judicial reprimands of Rule 11 violaters to be "fairly uncommon"
but suggesting that "reprimands of all shapes and sizes should be considered
more closely "because they are effective deterrents).
97. See Brown v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 72, 73 (S.D. Miss.
1986) (attorney fined $1,000 for filing frivolous suit); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v.
Group Sys. Int'l Far East, Ltd., 109 F.R.D. 594, 600 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (sanctions of
$5,000 imposed against attorney for failure to make sufficient inquiry into facts
determinative of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, rendering mo-
tion frivolous); Navarro v. Cohan, 109 F.R.D. 86, 89 (S.D. Fla. 1985) ($2,500 sanc-
tion imposed against plaintiff's counsel for ignoring court orders and for lack of
diligence in filing pleadings); Jorgenson v. County of Volusia, 625 F. Supp. 1543,
1549 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (plaintiff's counsel fined $500 for his "misleading and un-
ethical representation of the controlling law"); Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Pu-
erto Rico Marine Management Corp., 108 F.R.D. 96, 105-07 (D.N.J. 1985) (defense
counsel who willfully followed a litigation strategy of actively concealing from the
court and plaintiff as long as possible that the court was without power to hear
the matter fined $46,150.50); Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F. Supp.
467, 481-85 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (defense attorneys who filed a frivolous counterclaim
in an employee's wrongful discharge suit held liable for attorneys' fees and costs
of $14,692.50); Martinez v. Financial Collection Agencies, Inc., No. 82-2432-K (D.
Mass. May 20, 1985) (Keeton, J.) (defendants and counsel held jointly and sever-
ally liable for sanctions in the amount of $29,700 for willful violations of discovery
orders); Taylor v. Belger Cartage Service., Inc., 102 F.R.D. 172, 181-83 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (attorneys' fees of $14,736.95 imposed against counsel for terminated em-
ployee who filed a baseless suit against his former employer and union).
98. See Filippini v. Austin, 106 F.R.D. 425, 433-34 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Taylor v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 226, 228-29 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 751
F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1984) (table); Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 202-03.
99. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local No. 115 v. Armour &
Co., 106 F.R.D. 345 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
[Vol. 9:11
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solve the frivolous claims using the least expensive alternative.
The duty arises because the parties have the means available to
them, both informal and formal, to gain early access to the judge
presiding over their case. Because they have the means to keep
the cost of litigation to a minimum, the parties should alert the
court to problems that are possible to resolve early in the litiga-
tion, without the necessity for expensive, formal motions.
The duty is one of mitigation; it rests on the concept that the
victim of a frivolous lawsuit must use reasonable means to termi-
nate the litigation and to prevent the costs of that frivolous suit
from becoming excessive. If a party eventually wins rule 11 sanc-
tions, but has failed to use the least expensive route to early reso-
lution, the court may rule that not all the expenses the successful
party incurred in making formal motions were reasonable attor-
ney's fees that should be awarded under rule 11.100
In imposing sanctions the court must determine who is to pay
them: the party or counsel or both. If the Rule 11 violation is pri-
marily a professional dereliction (such as where a motion is unsup-
ported by existing law) the sanction should be imposed against the
attorney alone.'0 1 On the other hand, where the Rule 11 violation
reflects a "deliberate litigation strategy" sanctions may be imposed
jointly and severally against attorney and client.1'0 2
100. Id. at 350. One commentary on Rule 11 recently noted, however, that
mitigation may be easier in theory than in practice:
As soon as the Rule 11 claim (frivolous and baseless complaint,
groundless motion, invalid claim or defense, etc.) has surfaced, promptly
attempt to mitigate the problem by making a written request of the ad-
versary to drop the claim or motion. If unsuccessful, request a status
conference with the court in those courts that require informal status
conferences on matters at issue. Beware, however, that many federal dis-
trict courts are not prone to adjudicate matters so informally. An at-
tempt to mitigate the problem may be important to your later effort to
obtain sanctions.
Sanctions, supra note 2, at 11 (citations omitted).
101. Blake v. Nat'l Casualty Co., 607 F. Supp. 189, 193 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
("This sanction will be imposed against the attorney rather than the plaintiff be-
cause the motion [to remand] is unsupported by existing law, rather than unsup-
ported by facts"); Wold v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp. 166, 167-68 (D. Colo.
1983) (sanctions for frivolous motion to disqualify counsel imposed against attor-
ney alone). Note that the court may order the attorney to certify that no part of
the sanctions will be charged to or paid by the client. See Huetting & Schromm,
Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519, 1522 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
afl'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
102. See, e.g., Am. Sec. Van Lines, Inc. v. Gallagher, 782 F.2d 1056, 1057
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (both attorney and client held liable for advancing frivolous argu-
1986]
31
Roddy and Webb: Practice and Procedure under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
The circuit courts are thus far split on the issue of whether an
order imposing Rule 11 sanctions upon counsel is final and appeal-
able. Applying the Cohen'0 3 collateral order doctrine, the Ninth
Circuit has permitted an immediate appeal to be taken by the
party sanctioned.10 4 The Third Circuit will permit such immediate
appeals to be taken if the offending attorney withdraws from the
case in the court below.'0 5
The circuit courts are also apparently divided on the appropri-
ate standard of appellate review of Rule 11 orders. The Ninth'06
and Second10 7 circuits have adopted a three-part review formula:
(1) if the facts relied upon by the district court to establish a Rule
11 violation are disputed on appeal, the appellate court reviews the
district court's factual determinations under a "clearly erroneous"
standard; (2) if the legal conclusion of the district court that the
facts constitute a Rule 11 violation is disputed, the appellate court
reviews that legal conclusion de novo; and (3) if the appropriate-
ness of the sanction imposed is challenged, the court applies an
"abuse of discretion" standard. 08 The Third,1'0 Fourth,"0 Fifth,"'
ments); Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (same);
City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 106 F.R.D. 524, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ($5,000
in sanctions imposed jointly and severally against plaintiff and counsel who filed
frivolous fraud claim). Cf. The Committee on Federal Courts, Procedural Rights
of Attorneys Facing Sanctions 40 THE REC. 313, 325 (1985) (court should "allo-
cate the imposition of sanctions between an attorney and his client based upon
their culpability").
Chief Judge Weinstein states that where a client misleads his attorney and
causes him to file frivolous papers, "it is apparent that the client, not the attor-
ney, should be sanctioned." Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F.
Supp. 558, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
103. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
104. Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int'l Corp. v. Style Co., 760 F.2d 1045, 1047 n.1
(9th Cir. 1985).
105. Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 539-40
(3d Cir. 1985).
106. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986). See
also Mossman v. Roadway Express, Inc. 789 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating
"[w]e review the factual basis for these sanctions under the clearly erroneous
standard.").
107. Eastway Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir.
1985).
108. Id. Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 828; Mossman, 789 F.2d at 806.
109. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1986);
Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 1985).
110. Cohen v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 788 F.2d 247, 248 (4th Cir. 1986); La
Rouche v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1140 (4th Cir. 1986); Nelson v.
[Vol. 9:11
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Sixth,' 1 2 and Seventh 1 3 and Tenth' 14 Circuits generally apply an
abuse of discretion standard.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 11 have dramatically altered the nature of practice
in the federal courts. The rule changes may have altered the con-
duct of attorneys, clients and the courts in ways which cannot yet
be measured in any accurate fashion. 1 From the authors' experi-
ence, however, the requirements of the rule compel more elaborate
Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 750 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2358 (1985).
111. Jackson Marine Corp. v. Harvey Barge Repair, Inc., 794 F.2d 989, 992
(5th Cir. 1986).
112. Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (6th Cir. 1986).
113. Steward v. RCA Corp., 790 F.2d 624, 632 (7th Cir. 1986); Indianapolis
Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1985); Hilgeford v. Peo-
ples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985).
114. Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1986).
115. As the foregoing discussion should also indicate, there is no formula for
avoiding Rule 11 sanctions. In one recently published commentary, however the
authors offered the following "practical suggestions" for avoiding Rule 11
sanctions:
(1) recognize that your subjective good faith in filing a pleading is
not enough to avoid sanctions;
(2) confirm that the pleading is not designed to harass your adver-
sary or delay or extend the cost of litigation;
(3) conduct a thorough personal interview with the client and key
witnesses prior to filing a pleading;
(4) review all pertinent documents which may provide a basis for the
pleading;
(5) make your own personal assessment of legal issues such as venue,
jurisdiction and the statute of limitations;
(6) if you are not experienced in a given legal field (i.e., antitrust,
securities fraud, or civil racketeering) consider getting an independent
opinion from a more experienced attorney;
(7) do not delude the court as to the present state of the law; con-
firm that your legal theories are supported by existing law or a good faith
argument for its extension, reversal, or modification; and
(8) if you are compelled to file a pleading in a hurry to avoid a time
bar, do so and promptly thereafter carry out the following steps.
Sanctions, supra note 2, at 9-10. (emphasis added). Whether the experience
under new N.C.R. Civ. P. 11 (effective January 1, 1987-see supra note 2) will be
similar remains to be seen.
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pre-filing inquiry and investigation in federal suits and increase
the stakes and risks in litigating federal cases.
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